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I. INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972
(Title IX)' to address the widespread existence of sex discrimination in
educational institutions.' Twenty years later, in Franklin v. Gwinnett
County Public Schools,3 a unanimous Supreme Court put teeth into the
statute by finding that Title IX relief includes compensatory damages.4
1. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1988). Title IX provides that "[n]o person in the United States
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assis-
tance." Id. § 1681(a).
2. 118 Cong. Rec. 5804-07 (Feb. 28, 1972) (statements of Sen. Bayh).
3. 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992).
4. Id. Previously, courts had only awarded back pay and injunctive relief for violations of
Title IX. Civil rights leaders have praised the Franklin decision for making Title IX a more effec-
tive weapon against sex discrimination. See, for example, Linda Greenhouse, Court Opens Path for
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The Supreme Court's decision resolved a split of authority between the
Third Circuit 5 and the Seventh6 and Eleventh Circuits. The Court
agreed with the Third Circuit, which had recently become the first
court of appeals to find a right to compensatory relief under Title IX.8
Congress had two main objectives in enacting Title IX: (1) to re-
strict the disbursement of federal funds to institutions maintaining sex-
ually discriminatory practices and (2) to protect individuals against
such practices.' Congress explicitly granted the power to enforce Title
IX to federal agencies and departments that have the capacity to ex-
tend federal financial assistance to education programs or activities. 10
Pursuant to this delegation, the Department of Education is primarily
responsible for enforcing the statute." The Department also has the au-
thority to terminate federal funding to institutions in violation of the
statute. 12 Before such a termination, however, Title IX requires that the
Department of Education give an institution notice of its violation and
an opportunity for voluntary compliance.' 3
Title IX makes no explicit reference to the availability of compen-
satory damages. 14 Before the Supreme Court concluded that compensa-
tory damages are available under Title IX, the absence of express
private remedies forced lower courts to use statutory interpretation and
case precedent concerning similar statutes to determine this issue.
15
The Franklin decision resolves the confusion created by the lower
courts' inconsistent decisions. Franklin also makes Title IX-a statute
that had previously been ineffective and seldom used-a powerful
Student Suits in Sex-Bias Cases, N.Y. Times at Al (Feb. 27, 1992) (Final ed.); Paul M. Barrett,
Students May Seek Cash in Sex-Bias Cases, Wall St. J. at B8 (Feb. 27, 1992).
5. See Pfeiffer v. Marion Center Area Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d 779 (3d Cir. 1990).
6. See Lieberman v. University of Chicago, 660 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1981).
7. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 911 F.2d 617 (11th Cir. 1990).
8. See Pfeiffer, 917 F.2d at 788.
9. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979).
10. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1988).
11. The Department of Education is responsible for granting most of the federal financial
assistance to education. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare had responsibility for
administering federal funding to education programs and enforcing Title IX provisions until the
Department of Education Organization Act transferred such functions to the Department of Edu-
cation. Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 688 & n.3 (3d Cir. 1982), aff'd, 465 U.S. 555
(1984).
12. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1988).
13. Id.
14. Id. §§ 1681-1688.
15. See notes 28-61 and accompanying text. Courts agree that because Congress modeled
Title IX after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d to 2000d-5 (1988), the
two statutes deserve similar interpretation. Therefore, courts often rely on analyses from Title VI
cases when considering claims under Title IX. See Ronna Greff Schneider, Sexual Harassment
and Higher Education, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 525, 559 (1987).
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weapon against sex discrimination.16 In addition, the decision permits
courts to read the availability of remedies for which Congress has made
no explicit provision into other federal antidiscrimination statutes.
This Recent Development examines the potential effects of the
Franklin decision and forecasts possible limitations of the Supreme
Court's holding. Part II discusses the legal background that set the
foundation for the Franklin decision. Part III examines the majority
and concurring opinions in Franklin. Part IV discusses the implications
of the decision, including its effects on educational institutions, its pro-
tection of sex discrimination victims, and its potential impact on future
court interpretations of other civil rights statutes. Part V suggests pos-
sible ways in which lower courts may limit this broad decision in future
cases. Despite the possible negative consequences for educational insti-
tutions that may arise from the Franklin decision, Part VI concludes
that the decision will have a positive impact in its furtherance of Title
IX's purposes and its progressive effects on the state of civil rights law.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Judicial Implication of a Private Cause of Action Under Title
Ix
In Cannon v. University of Chicago1 7 the Supreme Court implied a
private cause of action under Title IX.' 1 Relying upon the four factors
set forth in Cort v. Ash, 9 the Court found that Congress intended to
make a remedy available to a special class of litigants.20 First, it deter-
mined that the plaintiff, a person discriminated against on the basis of
her sex, was a member of the class for whose benefit Congress designed
the statute.2 ' Second, the legislative history of Title IX and the fact
that Congress patterned the statute after Title VI of the Civil Rights
16. Greenhouse, N.Y. Times at Al (cited in note 4).
17. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
18. Id. at 717.
19. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). In determining whether to imply a private remedy into a statute not
expressly providing one, the Court looked to four factors:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was en-
acted"-that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff?. Second, is
there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or
to deny one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to
imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally
relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be
inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?
Id. at 78 (citations omitted).
20. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 688-89. The Court has recognized that the ultimate determination in
implying a cause of action is whether Congress intended to create a private remedy. See, for exam-
ple, Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979).
21. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694.
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Act of 1964 (Title VI),2 2 under which federal courts had implied a pri-
vate remedy by the time Congress enacted Title IX, indicated that Con-
gress intended to create a private cause of action.23 Third, implication
of a private remedy furthered Title IX's purpose of protecting individu-
als against discriminatory practices.24 Finally, the Court reasoned that
the federal government had conditioned the receipt of federal funds on
the prohibition against sexual discrimination in its role of protecting its
citizens from invidious discrimination.
25
Having determined that private remedies are available under Title
IX, the Court ended its analysis and refrained from addressing the spe-
cific types of private remedies available.26 Following Cannon, lower
courts granted declaratory and injunctive relief to private litigants in
Title IX actions.2 7 The availability of compensatory damages, however,
remained an open question until the Franklin decision.
B. Judicial Implication of a Damages Remedy Under Title IX
The Seventh Circuit refused to imply a damages remedy in Lieber-
man v. University of Chicago,8 the first case to consider the availabil-
ity of compensatory damages under Title IX.29 The Lieberman court
began its analysis by characterizing Title IX as legislation that Con-
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d to 2000d-5 (1988). Title VI provides that "[n]o person in the United
States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance." Id. § 2000d. The Cannon Court noted that Title IX uses identical
language to describe its benefitted class, except that it substitutes the word "sex" for the words
"race, color, or national origin." Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694-96. The Court also noted that Title VI
and Title IX provide for the same administrative termination of federal funding in the event that
an institution violates one of the statutes. Id.
23. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694, 696-98. See note 76 and accompanying text. Between 1967 and
1972 at least 12 federal courts found that Title Vi gives rise to a private right of action. Id. at 696.
See, for example, Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847, 852 (5th Cir. 1967).
24. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 706-08.
25. Id. at 708-09.
26. See id. at 709, 717.
27. See, for example, Sharif By Salahuddin v. New York State Educ. Dept., 709 F. Supp.
345 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
28. 660 F.2d 1185, 1186-88 (7th Cir. 1981). The plaintiff claimed that a medical school denied
her admission based on her gender. She alleged that this action constituted sex discrimination in
violation of Title IX. The plaintiff was forced to relocate in order to attend another medical school.
She sought compensatory damages for moving expenses, pain and suffering, and loss of consortium
resulting from her relocation. Id. at 1186. For discussions of Lieberman, see generally Note, Lie-
berman v. University of Chicago: Refusal to Imply a Damages Remedy Under Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972, 1983 Wis. L. Rev. 181; Comment, Implied Private Rights of Ac-
tion for Damages Under Title IX-Lieberman v. University of Chicago, 16 Ga. L. Rev. 511 (1982).
29. The Court has noted that "the question whether a litigant has a 'cause of action' is ana-
lytically distinct and prior to the question of what relief, if any, a litigant may be entitled to
receive." Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 (1979).
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gress passed pursuant to its constitutional spending power.3 0 In the case
of spending clause legislation the Supreme Court has held that Con-
gress must state any terms or conditions of funding in unambiguous
terms." The Supreme Court has declined to impose additional financial
obligations on recipients of federal funds without evidence in the
spending clause legislation of Congress' intent to impose such obliga-
tions.3 2 Thus, after classifying Title IX as spending clause legislation,
the Lieberman court concluded as a matter of statutory construction
that Congress must create an explicit damages remedy in Title IX if
Congress wants one to exist.3 3 A damages remedy fashioned by Con-
gress, rather than the courts, would give institutions ample notice of the
full extent of their potential Title IX liability and an opportunity to
reconsider their acceptance of federal funds.
3 4
The Lieberman court also noted that Title IX was part of a bill
enacted to assist institutions of higher education during a period of
"acute financial distress."3 5 Implying a damages remedy, the court rea-
soned, would interfere with this purpose by burdening educational in-
stitutions that were unaware of their Title IX liability with potentially
massive financial liability.36 Therefore, the Lieberman court concluded
that injunctive and administrative relief, along with attorney's fees, are
the only remedies available under Title IX.3 7
In its consideration of Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public
Schools,3 s the Eleventh Circuit also held that compensatory relief is not
30. Lieberman, 660 F.2d at 1187. The Court deemed Title IX an exercise of Congress' spend-
ing power since it was part of a bill designed to help educational institutions during a period of
"acute financial distress" through increased federal funding. Thus, the expenditure of federal
funds justified the imposition of the statutory prohibition against sex discrimination. Id.
31. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). In Pennhurst the
Court stated that:
[LIegislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature of a contract: in
return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed conditions. The
legitimacy of Congress' power to legislate under the spending power thus rests on whether the
State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the 'contract.'
Id.
32. Id. at 24-25.
33. Lieberman, 660 F.2d at 1188. The Lieberman court acknowledged that two other theories
of statutory interpretation exist in damages analysis: (1) negative implication or strict interpreta-
tion theory provides that when a statute expressly provides a particular remedy, courts may not
imply the existence of alternate remedies; (2) statutory purpose theory provides that a statutory
right implies the existence of all necessary and appropriate remedies. See id. at 1187 n.4. The court
did not attempt to resolve the inconsistency between these two theories since it found that the
Pennhurst analysis governed the case at bar. Id.
34. Id. at 1188.
35. Id. at 1187 (citation omitted).
36. Id. at 1188.
37. Id.
38. 911 F.2d 617 (11th Cir. 1990).
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available under Title IX.39 The Eleventh Circuit relied upon Drayden v.
Needville Independent School District40 in reaching this conclusion. In
Drayden the Fifth Circuit held that compensatory relief is not available
under Title VI.41 Since Congress patterned Title IX after Title VI, us-
ing nearly identical language to describe the benefitted class and pro-
viding for the same administrative termination of federal funding to
institutions engaged in the prohibited discrimination,42 the Eleventh
Circuit found that courts should use a substantially similar analysis to
interpret both statutes.43- The court thus adopted the Drayden court's
denial of compensatory relief and extended it to cases brought under
Title IX.
44
The Eleventh Circuit found that the Supreme Court's decision in
Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission45 did not overrule
Drayden.46 In Guardians, the Court determined that Title VI did not
authorize the award of compensatory damages for unintentional dis-
crimination.47 The Eleventh Circuit noted that the justices in Guardi-
ans did not form a majority regarding the issue of whether a court
could award damages in a case of intentional discrimination.48
The Eleventh Circuit further found that Congress passed Title IX
pursuant to its spending power. 49 Therefore, based on the Supreme
39. Id. at 622.
40. 642 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1981).
41. Id. at 133. The Drayden decision represented binding precedent for the Franklin court
since the Fifth Circuit rendered the decision prior to its division on October 1, 1981. Franklin, 911
F.2d at 620.
42. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694-96. See note 22 and accompanying text.
43. Franklin, 911 F.2d at 619. The court noted that it is the settled position of the courts to
treat Titles VI and IX similarly. Id.
44. Id. at 622.
45. 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
46. Franklin, 911 F.2d at 622.
47. Guardians, 463 U.S. at 607. This Title VI case concerned unintentional discrimination
that resulted from the disproportionate impact of examinations used to make entry-level appoint-
ments to the New York City Police Department on racial minorities. The Court denied compensa-
tory relief to the plaintiffs. Id. at 584-85. The justices wrote multiple opinions setting forth varying
reasons for their conclusions. Justices White and Rehnquist concluded that Title VI does not af-
ford compensatory relief in cases of unintentional discrimination, but explicitly left open the ques-
tion of the availability of compensatory damages in cases of intentional discrimination. Id. at 593,
597. Justice Powell and Chief Justice Burger concurred, but stated that no private right of action,
and thus no form of private relief, should exist under Title VI regardless of the circumstances. Id.
at 608 (Powell concurring). Justice O'Connor, also concurring, would not allow compensatory relief
absent a showing of discriminatory intent, but explicitly declined to address the question of
whether intentional discrimination should implicate compensatory relief. Id. at 612 n.1 (O'Connor
concurring). The four dissenting justices believed that Title VI entitles plaintiffs to compensatory
relief even in the absence of proof of discriminatory intent. Id. at 615 (Marshall dissenting), 645
(Stevens dissenting).
48. Franklin, 911 F.2d at 621.
49. Id. at 622. See notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
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Court's reasoning in Pennhurst, the court concluded that Title IX's
remedy provisions should include only equitable relief.50 The court then
suggested that an educational institution should retain the option of
terminating its acceptance of federal funding if it does not wish to com-
ply with a Title IX injunction."'
Shortly after the Eleventh Circuit decided Franklin, the Third Cir-
cuit reached a contrary holding in Pfeiffer v. Marion Center Area
School District,2 the first court of appeals decision to find a right to
compensatory damages under Title IX. In Pfeiffer a former student
brought an action for compensatory damages against her school district.
She alleged that the school district had violated Title IX by dismissing
her from the National Honor Society when she became pregnant."3
Since Pfeiffer's Title IX claim alleged intentional discrimination, the
court found it unnecessary to address the availability of compensatory
damages in cases concerning unintentional discrimination or discrimi-
natory effect.
5 4
The Pfeiffer court looked to the Supreme Court's decision in
Guardians for guidance. Unlike the Eleventh Circuit, however, the
Third Circuit read Guardians as authorizing compensatory relief for in-
tentional discrimination in violation of Title VI26 The Pfeiffer court
found that a majority of the Guardians Court, in their various opinions,
recognized the availability of damages for intentional discrimination. 57
The Pfeiffer court applied the Supreme Court justices' opinions in
Guardians to Title IX claims and held that compensatory relief is
available when a plaintiff alleges and establishes intentional discrimina-
tion in violation of Title IX.
68
Therefore, when the Supreme Court implied a private cause of ac-
tion under Title IX in Cannon, it did not specify the remedies available
to a litigant alleging a Title IX violation. 59 Since the Cannon decision,
50. Id. at 621.
51. Id. at 621.
52. 917 F.2d 779 (3d Cir. 1990). At least one district court has also found that compensatory
relief is available under Title IX. See Beehler v. Jeffes, 664 F. Supp. 931, 940 (M.D. Pa. 1986).
53. Pfeiffer, 917 F.2d at 782-83. The district court made a factual finding that the faculty
council of the National Honor Society did not dismiss Pfeiffer because of her pregnancy, but
rather because of her failure to uphold the standards of the Society by engaging in premarital
sexual intercourse. The district court, therefore, held that the faculty council and school board did
not violate Title IX. Id. at 784.
54. Id. at 788.
55. Id.
56. Id. For a discussion of the Eleventh Circuit's contrary interpretation of Guardians, see
notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
57. Pfeiffer, 917 F.2d at 788.
58. Id. at 788-89.
59. See notes 17-27 and accompanying text.
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lower courts have reached differing results on the question of the avail-
ability of compensatory relief under Title IX.6 0 The Supreme Court did
not address the remedies question directly until the Franklin case. 1
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENT: THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN
FRANKLIN V. GWINNETT COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS
In 1988 Christine Franklin, a former student at North Gwinnett
High School in Georgia, brought a Title IX action claiming sexual har-
assment by Andrew Hill, a teacher and coach at her school. Franklin
sought compensatory relief for the school's alleged Title IX violations.
In her complaint she alleged that Hill engaged her in sexually-oriented
conversations, forcibly kissed her on the mouth once in the school park-
ing lot, telephoned her at home to ask if she would meet him socially,
and on three occasions subjected her to coercive sexual intercourse in a
private office at the school. Franklin further averred that although
teachers and administrators became aware of Hill's actions toward
Franklin and other female students, they made no attempt to stop his
conduct, but rather discouraged Franklin from bringing charges against
Hill. When Hill resigned, the school closed its investigation of the
allegations.2
The district court dismissed the action on the ground that compen-
satory damages are not available for Title IX violations.6 The Eleventh
Circuit affirmed on the same basis. 4 Because the Eleventh Circuit's
holding conflicted with the Third Circuit's decision in Pfeiffer, the Su-
preme Court granted certiorari. 5
A. Majority Opinion
In its reversal of the Eleventh Circuit's decision, the Supreme
Court relied heavily upon Bell v. Hood.6 In Bell, the Supreme Court
held that courts may award any available relief to one whose legal
rights have been invaded in violation of a federal statute containing a
cause of action. 7 The Franklin Court stated that it would presume that
all appropriate remedies are available under Title IX since Congress
60. Contrast Lieberman v. University of Chicago, 660 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding that
compensatory relief is not available under Title IX) with Pfeiffer v. Marion Center Area Sch. D.,
917 F.2d 779 (3d Cir. 1990) (reaching a contrary result).
61. See Schneider, 65 Tex. L. Rev. at 559 (cited in note 15).
62. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1031. Hill resigned on the condition that the school drop any and
all charges against him. Id.
63. Id. at 1031-32.
64. Franklin, 911 F.2d at 622. See notes 38-51 and accompanying text.
65. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1032.
66. 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
67. Id. at 684.
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had not specifically expressed a contrary intent.68 The majority rejected
the contention that subsequent Court decisions have eroded the long-
standing Bell principle.6 9
The majority found support for its decision in Guardians."0 Despite
the multiple opinions in the Guardians case, the Franklin Court be-
lieved that the Guardians decision represented a clear majority view of
the Court that damages are available in an intentional discrimination
action under Title VI.7' In addition, the Court observed that no Justice
in Guardians challenged the presumption that a court may award all
appropriate relief in a cognizable cause of action.72
In declining to treat its inquiry as one of pure statutory construc-
tion, the Court looked to the state of the law at the time of Title IX's
enactment to determine whether Congress intended to limit the reme-
dies available for Title IX violations.7" In 1972 courts strictly followed
the traditional presumption in favor of all appropriate remedies. 4 At
that time, the Supreme Court had recently implied causes of action in
six cases and found damage remedies to exist in three of them.7 5 Al-
though the status of the law must have been clear to legislators when
they passed Title IX, they expressed no intent to abandon the tradi-
tional rule.76 In fact, as the Franklin Court noted, Congress eventually
passed two amendments to Title IX which evidenced congressional sup-
port for the Cannon decision without any hint of rejecting the tradi-
tional presumption in favor of all appropriate relief.
77
68. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1032.
69. Id. at 1034. The Court cited three cases in support of this proposition: J. L Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (holding that the Securities Exchange Act authorizes a private right of
action for recission or damages to a corporate stockholder with respect to a consummated merger
that is authorized pursuant to the use of a proxy statement alleged to contain false and misleading
statements); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969) (holding that compensatory
damages are available under 42 U.S.C. § 1982); and Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) (holding
that students bringing actions against school officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are entitled to recover
only nominal damages absent proof of actual injury).
70. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1035.
71. Id. The Supreme Court also recognized this majority belief in Consolidated Rail Corp. v.
Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984).
72. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1035.
73. Id. at 1035-36. Courts should assume that Congress knows the law and should interpret
legislative enactments in conformity with precedent. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 696-99.
74. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1036.
75. Id. The six cases were J. L Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (approving a damages
remedy); Wyandotte Transportation Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967) (approving a dam-
ages remedy); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections,
393 U.S. 544 (1969); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969) (approving a dam-
ages remedy); and Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
76. See Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1036.
77. Id. The first amendment to Title IX was the Civil Rights Remedies Equalization Amend-
ment of 1986, 42 US.C. § 2000d-7 (1988, & Supp. 1991), which abrogated the States' Eleventh
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The Franklin majority stated that the silence of the legislative his-
tory and the statutory text on the issue of private remedies did not
mean that Congress did not intend to create any such remedies.7 Since
Title IX did not even expressly create a private cause of action, the
Franklin majority noted that it was hardly surprising that the statute
did not include express remedies.
79
The Court rejected all three of the respondents' arguments that the
Court should deviate from the traditional rule of awarding any appro-
priate relief.80 First, the Court disagreed with the contention that
awarding monetary relief would interfere with the separation of powers
by expanding the judiciary's reach into areas usually reserved to the
executive and legislative branches."' Second, the majority flatly rejected
the argument that the traditional presumption should not apply to leg-
islation passed pursuant to the spending clause.82 The Court noted that
its rejection of the spending clause exception was consistent with its
unanimous decision in Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone,83 which al-
lowed monetary awards of back pay under a spending clause statute.
8 4
Because the Franklin case involved intentional discrimination, the
Court deemed the Pennhurst decision's concern with giving fund recipi-
ents notice of their liability irrelevant.8 Finally, the Court dismissed
the assertion that any remedies allowed under Title IX should be lim-
Amendment immunity under Title IX. This law states that in a suit against a State, "remedies
(including remedies both at law and equity) are available for such a violation to the same extent as
such remedies are available for such a violation in the suit against any public or private entity
other than a State." Id. § 2000d-7(a)(2). The Court read this statute as a clear validation of the
Cannon holding. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1036. The second amendment was the Civil Rights Resto-
ration Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988), codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681, 1687, 1688;
29 U.S.C. §§ 706, 794; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-4a, 6107 (1988), which broadened the coverage of the
antidiscrimination provisions of Title IX.
78. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1035.
'79. Id.
80. Id. at 1037-38. The United States joined in respondents' arguments as amicus curiae. Id.
81. Id. at 1037. The Court stated that the discretion to award appropriate relief involves no
increase in judicial power, unlike the finding of a cause of action, which authorizes a court to hear
a case or controversy. The Court believed that the respondents misconceived the difference be-
tween a cause of action and a remedy. Id.
82. Id.
83. 465 U.S. 624 (1984).
84. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1037-38.
85. Id. Although an institution engaged in intentional discrimination is aware that it is vio-
lating its duty not to discriminate on the basis of sex, the Court did not explain how such an
institution could have been on notice of its monetary liability prior to the Franklin holding. See id.
In its discussion the Court pointed out that Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57
(1986), supports treating the sexual harassment and abuse of a student by a teacher as a form of
sex discrimination prohibited by Title IX. Id. at 64 (stating that "when a supervisor sexually ha-
rasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor 'discriminate[s]' on the basis
of sex").
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ited to back pay and prospective relief."' The Court found that when, as
here, the victim is a student who no longer attends the educational in-
stitution, such remedies provide no meaningful relief."1 In any case, the
Court noted that courts generally decide as a threshold matter whether
monetary damages are adequate before even considering the availability
of equitable relief.""
Based on this reasoning, the Supreme Court unanimously held that
remedies for Title IX violations include monetary damages. 9 The Court
also announced the general rule that in the absence of clear congres-
sional intent to the contrary, federal courts may award any appropriate
relief in a cognizable cause of action brought under a federal statute.9 0
B. Concurring Opinion
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas, wrote a concurring opinion in Franklin.91 Though agreeing
with the majority's holding, the concurring justices based their conclu-
sion on much narrower reasoning. Justice Scalia believed that since the
private right of action under Title IX had been implied by the judici-
ary, rather than expressly created by Congress, the courts should also
have the power to limit the particular remedies available.9 2 Scalia sug-
gested that he would have taken such an approach in this case, and
denied compensatory relief, if Congress had not subsequently enacted
the Civil Rights Remedies Equalization Amendment of 1986, which ap-
peared to recognize the availability of damages under Title IX.9 3 Justice
Scalia further suggested that the judiciary should abandon the implica-
tion of private causes of action altogether.94 In support of this proposi-
86. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1038.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. The Court did not, however, decide whether to award damages to Christine Franklin.
The Court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its holding. Id.
90. Id. at 1035.
91. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1038 (Scalia concurring).
92. Id. at 1039 (Scalia concurring). Justice Scalia reasoned that "[t]o require, with respect to
a right that is not consciously and intentionally created, that any limitation of remedies must be
express, is to provide, in effect, that the most questionable of private rights will also be the most
expansively remediable." Id. Scalia agreed with the United States' position that "[w]hatever the
merits of 'implying' rights of action may be, there is no justification for treating [congressional]
silence as the equivalent of the broadest imaginable grant of remedial authority." Id. (quoting
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 12-13, Franklin v. Gwinnett
County Public Schools, 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992) (No. 90-918)).
93. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1039 (Scalia concurring).
94. Id. (Scalia concurring). Justice Scalia also discussed this notion in his concurrence in
Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 191 (1988).
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tion, he pointed to recent Supreme Court cases that have drifted away
from Cannon's expansive rights-creating approach. 5
IV. POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF THE FRANKLIN DECISION
A. Effects on Educational Institutions
The Supreme Court's decision in Franklin will affect educational
institutions and the state of civil rights law, while furthering the pur-
poses of Title IX. The decision will have its most direct, and perhaps
most negative, impact on educational institutions that receive federal
funding. The availability of compensatory damages under Title IX may
subject these institutions to massive financial liability. 6 The Lieberman
court recognized that the costs of compensatory damage awards could
be significant to institutional defendants.9 The court claimed that one
of the purposes of Title IX was to help institutions of higher learning
adjust to a situation of acute financial distress. 8 Making educational
institutions liable for unpredictable compensatory damage awards
would frustrate that purpose.
The purpose stated by the Lieberman court, however, was not one
of the two main purposes set forth in Cannon.9 9 In fact, the Supreme
Court actually rejected the notion that Congress intended to insulate
educational institutions from the costs of litigation. 100 In reality, a ter-
mination of federal funds may often be as severe as the imposition of
liability for compensatory damages. 10' In any event, the requirement of
proving intentional discrimination will help limit the number of actions
brought for damages and the resulting costs to educational institu-
tions. 02 In order to minimize the liability of educational institutions,
courts should also make monetary awards only when the discrimination
95. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1039 (Scalia concurring). Justice Scalia's discussion referred to
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575-76 (1979) (refusing to imply a private cause of
action for damages under § 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934), and Transamerica
Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 18, 23-24 (1979) (implying a private cause of action for
damages under § 215 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, but refusing to imply such a private
cause of action under § 206 of the Act, which only proscribed certain conduct and did not create or
alter any civil liabilities).
96. Lieberman, 660 F.2d at 1188.
97. Id. The court stated that "[t]heoretically, this liability could exceed the amount of the
federal funds received." Id. According to news reports, Christine Franklin is seeking six million
dollars for her claim of sex discrimination under Title IX. See Linda P. Campbell, Women Hail
Ruling to Sue Schools in Sex Bias Cases, Chicago Tribune at Cl (Feb. 27, 1992).
98. Lieberman, 660 F.2d at 1188 (quoting 2 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1972 at 2463).
99. See note 9 and accompanying text.
100. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 709-10.
101. Commentary, Compensatory Relief Under Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972, 68 Educ. L. Rptr. 557, 570 (1991).
102. See id. at 571. See also notes 139-46 and accompanying text.
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caused actual and apparent harm to the victim. 03
The creation of liability for damages under Title IX will take insti-
tutions by surprise. Title IX expressly provides that an institution's
failure to comply with the statute's nondiscrimination requirement may
result in the termination of federal funding or other action authorized
by law.104 The statutory text does not, however, mention liability for
monetary damages as a consequence of Title IX violations.' 6 Title IX
clearly provides that no federal department or agency may take en-
forcement action before both giving notice to the institution of its fail-
ure to comply with the statute and determining that compliance with
the statute cannot be secured by voluntary means. 0 6 Thus, the enacting
Congress expressly intended to put institutions on notice of their Title
IX violations before administrative agencies or departments proceeded
to take punitive action. 107 Similarly, Congress would have wanted insti-
tutions to be on notice of their Title IX violations before subjecting
them to liability for monetary damages. Holding institutions liable for
monetary damages places a significant penalty on institutions that may
have voluntarily altered their conduct had they known they were in vio-
lation of Title IX. 0 8 If subsequent court decisions adopt the require-
ment that a plaintiff must prove intentional discrimination in order to
receive compensatory relief; 0 9 however, institutions cannot argue that
they were unaware or without notice of their violations. They can only
argue that they were unaware of their liability for monetary damages.
The Supreme Court indicated in Guardians that "make whole"
remedies may not be appropriate for causes of action contained in legis-
lation passed pursuant to Congress' spending power." 0 Some courts
have found that Title IX is such a statute."' An institution's accept-
ance of federal funding under spending clause legislation is optional." 2
An institution that receives federal funds under the spending clause
must be aware of the obligations attached to the grant from the begin-
ning. Such awareness enables the institution to weigh accurately the
costs and benefits of accepting the funds and complying with their con-
103. See Pfeiffer v. Marion Center Area Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d 779, 786 (3d Cir. 1990); Com-
mentary, 68 Educ. L. Rptr. at 572.
104. See 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1988).
105. See id.
106. Id.
107. See Commentary, 68 Educ. L. Rptr. at 570.
108. See id.
109. See notes 139-46 and accompanying text.
110. Guardians, 463 U.S. at 596.
111. See, for example, Lieberman, 660 F.2d at 1187.
112. Guardians, 463 U.S. at 596.
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ditions.113 If a court declares that a recipient must assume further un-
anticipated obligations and duties in order to comply with the funding
conditions, the recipient should be able to withdraw and terminate its
receipt of federal funds.11 4 As a result of the Franklin decision, some
institutions may opt to discontinue their receipt of federal funds in or-
der to avoid the nondiscrimination requirement and the newly created
potential liability for monetary damages.11 5 If institutions reject federal
funds, the decrease in financial resources may harm students of the in-
stitution, the very individuals that Title IX was designed to benefit. In
the final analysis, however, the availability of compensatory damages
will work more to the benefit than to the detriment of students.
B. Furtherance of the Purposes of Title IX
The availability of compensatory damages in Title IX actions will
further the two primary objectives of the statute as set forth by the
Cannon Court. 16 The Cannon Court recognized that the express ad-
ministrative remedy of fund termination serves the first purpose of
avoiding federal funding of discriminatory practices."' The Court
noted, though, that such a remedy often may not further Title IX's sec-
ond purpose of providing individuals with protection against sex dis-
crimination." 8 The availability of damage awards will serve the Court's
second purpose by deterring discriminatory practices and by compen-
sating individuals harmed by such practices." 9
The availability of compensatory damages will increase the likeli-
hood that victims of discrimination will bring private actions against
institutions in order to obtain such relief. 2 ' Because of the high costs
and long duration of private damage actions, the threat of such actions
will be an effective deterrent against sex discrimination. The availabil-
ity of compensatory damages will also further the purposes of Title IX
by affording meaningful compensation to victims of sex discrimination.
As the Cannon Court made clear, Title IX's drafters focused specifi-
cally on the benefitted class and its rights; the drafters did not simply
113. Id.
114. Id. at 597. See also Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 702 (3d Cir. 1982), aft'd,
465 U.S. 555 (1984).
115. Negative effects may occur particularly in schools' sports programs. In order to provide
equal opportunities for men and women, athletic departments may cut mens' programs due to
their financial inability to add sports for women. See Tom Weir, All Must Face Cold Facts of Title
IX, USA Today at 3C (March 13, 1992).
116. See note 9 and accompanying text.
117. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704.
118. Id. at 704-05.
119. See Note, 1983 Wis. L. Rev. at 207 (cited in note 28).
120. See Commentary, 68 Educ. L. Rptr. at 571 (cited in note 101).
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ban sex discrimination by federally funded institutions or prohibit the
disbursement of federal funds to those institutions engaging in discrim-
ination. 2' Indeed, injunctive relief or the termination of federal funding
will often be meaningless to a student-plaintiff.122 Since students are by
nature transient, the direct value to them of any institutional reform is
minimal.1 2 An award of compensatory damages, therefore, is the most
meaningful type of relief for a student harmed by sex discrimination.
C. Effects on Civil Rights Law
Following the Franklin decision, all courts may consider compensa-
tory damage awards, as well as other relief, for victims of sex discrimi-
nation. In addition to resolving the disagreement among courts as to
the types of relief available under Title IX,'24 the Franklin Court also
expanded the possible types of Title IX claims to include sexual harass-
ment.125 In prior cases, courts had been reluctant to allow student
claims of sexual harassment by teachers, particularly claims of environ-
mental harassment. 126 The Franklin majority, however, did not hesitate
to recognize Christine Franklin's claim of sexual harassment as a cogni-
zable action under Title IX.1
27
In addition to its direct impact on the types of claims and remedies
allowed under Title IX, the Franklin decision also has general implica-
tions for other civil rights laws. Legal commentators have recognized
that the Supreme Court, with its current conservative majority, has be-
gun to restrict the Court's prior broad interpretations of civil rights and
antidiscrimination statutes. 2 s These commentators have predicted that
the Court's recent decisions will discourage private civil rights ac-
tions. 29 The Franklin decision, however, with its broad reading of the
121. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 690-93.
122. See notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
123. Schneider, 65 Tex. L. Rev. at 527 (cited in note 15).
124. For a discussion of the confusion surrounding the types of relief available under Title
IX prior to the Supreme Court decision in Franklin, see Comment, The Harms of Asking: To-
wards a Comprehensive Treatment of Sexual Harassment, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 328, 352 (1988).
125. See Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1037.
126. See Comment, Students Versus Professors: Combatting Sexual Harassment Under Ti-
tle IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 23 Conn. L. Rev. 355, 400-07 (1991).
127. See note 85 and accompanying text.
128. See, for example, Samuel A. Marcosson and Charles A. Shanor, Battleground for a Di-
vided Court: Employment Discrimination in the Supreme Court, 1988-89, 6 Labor Law. 145, 145-
46 (1990); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/President
Civil Rights Game, 79 Cal. L. Rev. 613, 680-83 (1991) (setting forth a game theory analysis of the
Court/Congress/President interaction).
129. Marcosson and Shanor, 6 Labor Law. at 146. Commentators have concluded that recent
civil rights "decisions will shift enforcement of employment discrimination cases away from private
litigation toward governmental enforcement, that they will move the locus of policy making in the
civil rights field from the courts to the Congress, and that they will lead courts interpreting stat-
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remedies and types of claims included under Title IX, signals a halt to
the Court's narrowing interpretations of civil rights legislation." 0 Lower
courts may use the Franklin holding as precedent for establishing the
availability of compensatory relief under two similar antidiscrimination
statutes-Title VI, which prohibits racial discrimination in federally
funded programs, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
(Section 504),131 which prohibits discrimination against handicapped in-
dividuals in federally funded programs.132
Another important aspect of the Franklin decision is the Court's
recognition that the only congressional intent relevant to the Court's
decision is the congressional intent at the time of the statute's enact-
ments. s13 The Court should extend this focus on Congress' original in-
tent to the Court's considerations of other statutes. Although the Court
has previously recognized the importance of Congress' intent at the
time it enacted a given statute, 134 legal scholars have suggested that the
Court tends to favor preferences of the current Congress over prefer-
ences of the enacting Congress.135 Professor William Eskridge, Jr. be-
lieves that the Court practices judicial activism when it refuses to
follow the traditional approach to statutory interpretation, which is
grounded upon original intent theory. 36 The Court's disregard of con-
gressional intent explains the necessity of Congress' recent legislation
reversing Court decisions concerning civil rights matters."3 "
utes to focus increasingly on the statutory text rather than legislative history and administrative
interpretations." Id. at 146-47.
130. Lawyers for civil rights' groups expressed surprise over the Franklin outcome, in light of
several recent narrow interpretations of federal civil rights laws by the Supreme Court. See Green-
house, N.Y. Times at Al (cited in note 4).
131. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
132. Note, 1983 Wis. L. Rev. at 183-85 & nn. 16-17 (cited in note 28). Courts agree that an
implied private cause of action exists under Title VI. See id. at 184 n.16. Currently, however, in the
absence of a Supreme Court decision directly addressing the availability of compensatory damages
for intentional discrimination in violation of Title VI, lower courts are divided on the availability
of remedies other than declaratory or injunctive relief for such discrimination. See id. Although the
justices discussed the issue in their various opinions in Guardians, a decision denying compensa-
tory damages for unintentional discrimination, their respective views on the availability of com-
pensatory damages for intentional discrimination were unclear. Thus, lower courts are not in
agreement as to whether or not a majority of the Guardians Court supported awarding damages
for intentional discrimination. See notes 47-48, 55-58 and accompanying text.
Similarly, while recognizing an implied private cause of action under Section 504, courts disa-
gree on the availability of damages remedies thereunder. See Note, 1983 Wis. L. Rev. at 185 n. 17.
133. See Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1035-36 (majority opinion), 1039 (Scalia concurring). See
also notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
134. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 378 (1982).
135. Eskridge, 79 Cal. L. Rev. at 617 (cited in note 128).
136. Id. at 617, 664-66. Eskridge has argued that the Rehnquist Court is particularly activist
since it slights even current congressional preferences. Id. at 617.
137. Id. See, for example, Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988)
(providing for the shifting of attorney's fees in favor of civil rights plaintiffs and overriding the
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An important question for the future is whether the Court will re-
tain its activist approach by continuing to disregard the intent of the
enacting Congress. 138 The Franklin decision suggests a negative answer
to this question. The Court appears to have recognized from Congress'
overrides of Court decisions that it must abide by congressional intent
more closely than in the past if it wants its decisions to stand. The
Franklin decision reflects the Court's new reluctance to replace Con-
gress' intentions with the Court's own values in civil rights matters. The
impact of the Court's new attitude, if it continues, will be significant to
future Court considerations of civil rights statutes.
V. POSSIBLE LIMITATIONS ON FRANKLIN IN FUTURE COURT
APPLICATIONS
A. Requirement of Intent
Although the Franklin decision is undeniably broad, the Supreme
Court's treatment, or nontreatment, of certain issues leaves opportuni-
ties open for lower courts to limit the Franklin holding in the future.
The Franklin Court did not address the availability of damages in cases
of unintentional discrimination or discriminatory impact since Chris-
tine Franklin alleged intentional discrimination. 39 In order to mitigate
the decision's negative impact on educational institutions, lower courts
should not extend the Franklin holding to cases of unintentional dis-
crimination. Rather, courts should award monetary damages only in
cases that clearly involve intentional discrimination. The Supreme
Court's holding in Guardians supports the disallowance of compensa-
tory damages as a form of relief for unintentional discrimination.'40 Al-
though the Guardians decision concerned a Title VI claim, courts
Supreme Court's decision to the contrary in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,
421 U.S. 240 (1975)); Civil Rights Remedies Equalization Amendment of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7
(1988 & Supp. 1991) (abrogating the sovereign immunity of States under the Eleventh Amendment
in various civil rights statutes and reversing the Court's decision in Atascadero State Hospital v.
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985)); Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28
(1988), codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681, 1687, 1688; 29 U.S.C. §§ 706, 794; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-4a, 6107
(1988) (overriding Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984), which narrowly interpreted the
"program or activity" language of Title IX and limited the application of Title IX to Grove City's
federally funded programs, for example, its financial aid department, rather than applying it to all
departments of the school). For a more complete discussion of the Grove City decision, see gener-
ally Comment, Grove City College v. Bell: The Weakening of Title IX, 20 New Eng. L. Rev. 805
(1986).
138. Eskridge, 79 Cal. L. Rev. at 617.
139. See note 85 and accompanying text. Claims of intentional discrimination or disparate
treatment require a showing of intent to discriminate, while unintentional or disparate impact
cases require only that a "facially neutral policy have a substantially disproportionate adverse im-
pact upon a protected group." Schneider, 65 Tex. L. Rev. at 553 (cited in note 15).
140. For a discussion of Guardians, see note 47 and accompanying text.
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should interpret Title IX similarly' 4 1 and should, therefore, extend the
Guardians Court's denial of compensatory relief for unintentional dis-
crimination to Title IX claims. The intent requirement also furthers
Congress' desire to give educational institutions notice of their Title IX
violations before imposing severe penalties on them.142 Furthermore,
the intent requirement will reduce the number of Title IX suits brought
and thus protect educational institutions from unlimited financial
liability. 43
The question of whether Title IX has any application whatsoever
in cases of unintentional discrimination remains unsettled. 44 The
Guardians opinions suggest that intent is in fact a required element of
any Title IX action. 45 Other courts, however, have found that Title IX
covers unintentional discrimination as well. 46 Any courts that decide to
apply Title IX to cases of unintentional discrimination should grant lib-
eral injunctive and equitable relief, but should refrain from awarding
compensatory relief.
B. Limitations of the Bell Principle
In Franklin, the Supreme Court adhered to the presumption that
courts may grant all appropriate relief when Congress has not expressly
limited their ability to do so.147 The Court dismissed the argument that
its decisions since Bell v. Hood have eroded this presumption. 48 The
Franklin Court, however, may have underestimated the merit of this
argument. The Court's decisions since Bell have in fact eroded the pre-
sumption of any appropriate relief. The Guardians Court recognized
that the traditional rule must yield in cases in which its application
would frustrate the intent of Congress or the purposes of the statute
involved. 149 In Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 50 the
Court stated that courts must be cautious when reading additional rem-
edies into statutes that already expressly provide for particular reme-
dies.'' The Court reasoned that only strong evidence of congressional
141. See note 22 and accompanying text.
142. See notes 110-15 and accompanying text.
143. See Note, 1983 Wis. L. Rev. at 208 (cited in note 28).
144. See Schneider, 65 Tex. L. Rev. at 557 (cited in note 15).
145. Id. at 558. Agencies may be able to override this intent requirement, however, by issuing
regulations that allow an impact standard for sex discrimination. Id. at 559.
146. See, for example, Sharif By Salahuddin v. New York State Educ. Dept., 709 F. Supp.
345, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that plaintiffs who showed disparate impact on women could
prevail under Title IX even without proving intentional discrimination).
147. See notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
148. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1034.
149. Guardians, 463 U.S. at 595.
150. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
151. Id. at 19.
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intent could override such a basic tenet of statutory construction.152
Since Congress has shown that it knows how to provide expressly for a
private damages remedy in its legislation, the Court found that the ab-
sence of such an express remedy strongly suggests that one was not
intended. 53
Title IX includes no express private remedies. 154 The limits on the
Bell decision created by the Court in Transamerica thus have no rele-
vance to the implication of a damages remedy under Title IX. Once the
Cannon Court implied a private right of action under the statute, it had
to imply particular remedies in order to make any available. 5 In stat-
utes providing express private remedies, however, the Franklin Court's
reaffirmation of the Bell principle may not control. Rather, the Court's
analyses from other recent decisions such as Guardians and Tran-
samerica may apply to override the Bell presumption.
C. Reconsideration of Cannon
The Franklin concurrence suggested that the Court should never
imply private causes of action. 5 ' The concurring justices' concern over
the implication of private rights of action challenges the Cannon deci-
sion and may threaten future court attempts to imply causes of action
into statutes. The Court has recognized its application of a stricter
standard for implying causes of action in recent years. 57 Formerly, the
Court rarely refused to imply a private remedy when Congress enacted
a statute to benefit a special class. 58 The Court did not view Congress'
failure to provide certain remedies as dispositive.159 With the Cort deci-
sion in 1975, the Court modified its approach by concentrating on legis-
lative intent in deciding whether to imply a private right of action. 160
The Franklin concurrence warns that the refusal to imply a private
152. Id. at 20. The Court stated that "[the dispositive question remains whether Congress
intended to create any such remedy [of damages]." Id. at 24.
153. Id. at 21.
154. Title IX only provides expressly for an administrative remedy of fund termination to an
institution violating the statute. See 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1988).
155. Note, 1983 Wis. L. Rev. at 204-05 (cited in note 28). Title VI and Section 504 also
contain no express private remedies. Thus, courts may apply the Bell principle liberally in inter-
preting available remedies under these statutes.
156. See Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1039 (Scalia concurring). Some civil rights groups found the
concurrence disturbing. See Nancy E. Roman, School Sex-Bias Law Allows for Damages, Justices
Rule, Wash. Times at A5 (Feb. 27, 1992) (Final ed.) (attorney for NOW Legal Defense Fund stat-
ing that "[e]ven in this victory for civil rights, they [the concurring justices] take an opportunity to
indicate again that without clear legislative mandate, they would be willing to limit civil rights").
157. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979).
158. Merrill Lynch, 456 U.S. at 374-75; Note, 1983 Wis. L. Rev. at 205 (cited in note 28).
159. Merrill Lynch, 456 U.S. at 377; Note, 1983 Wis. L. Rev. at 205.
160. Merrill Lynch, 456 U.S. at 377.
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right of action could become the rule rather than the exception in fu-
ture decisions if the view of Justices Scalia, Thomas and Rehnquist
prevails. 6 '
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Franklin will undoubtedly have
significant ramifications. The decision will have its most visible effects
on educational institutions that receive federal funding and on victims
of Title IX sex discrimination. Although court awards of monetary
damages will be costly to institutions, such remedies represent the most
effective means of compensating individual victims of sex discrimina-
tion and of deterring such discriminatory conduct -by institutions.
Courts should limit the dangers of placing potentially massive financial
liability on educational institutions by requiring that victims prove dis-
criminatory intent in order to receive damages and by awarding mone-
tary damages only when the victim suffers actual and apparent harm.
Judges and juries' 62 should award damages in amounts commensurate
with the harm suffered by the plaintiff.
The Franklin decision clarifies the state of the law with respect to
the specific remedies available under Title IX. The holding will also
affect future court interpretations of similar antidiscrimination statutes.
Legal commentators must reexamine the direction of the Supreme
Court in light of its unusually broad reading of this piece of civil rights
legislation. Further, the full impact of the Franklin decision must be
reevaluated in light of future lower court applications, and possible lim-
itations, of the decision.'6a Ultimately, however, the positive conse-
quences of the decision should outweigh any potential negative effects
on educational institutions. The decision represents a clear, though sur-
prising, victory for civil rights groups.
Susan L. Wright
161. The Court's approach to implying private remedies has evolved over the years along
with the sophistication of federal legislation. The original test of implying a private remedy if the
statute benefitted a special class was appropriate when legislation was less comprehensive than it
is today. See id. at 374.
162. Juries may now hear Title IX cases since a constitutional right to a jury trial exists in
actions enforcing statutory rights when the rights and remedies under the statute are enforceable
in an action for damages. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974).
163. Issues such as retroactivity and the appropriate calculation of damages were not re-
solved by the Franklin Court.
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